The background of the insect itself was much less clear. The Hessian fly (in modern classifications a gall midge, Mayetiola destructor) suddenly became visible in the late 1770s on farms around New York City, where it destroyed entire fields of wheat in the course of a few days. Scientifically literate individuals in both North America and Europe were soon debating both its geographic origin and its recent and potential migrations. If it was an Old World insect, where had it been living, apparently unnoticed? Why had it crossed the ocean at that moment, more than a century after Europeans first planted wheat on the Atlantic seaboard? Had it, in fact, had been brought by the German-speaking troops sent across the Atlantic by the British government to put down the American rebellion? If, on the other hand, it was indigenous to America, how had it learned to feed on wheat; and, more importantly, could it reach, or be kept from reaching, the fields of England?
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Study of the early history of the Hessian fly is important from four perspectives. First, it illuminates the dynamics of the science and policy of biological invasion in the era when tools for investigating, discussing, and interdicting insects were first taking shape. Recent work has highlighted how important and how intricate horticultural introductions were in the eighteenth century, but much less is known about issues involving novel pests during this period. The early discussions of the Hessian fly display struggles over insect identities and life histories, interactions between knowledge and interest, and pathways for structuring prudent policy. 2 The second area of significance comes from the fly's status as a participant in the Atlantic world during the Age of Revolution. Elizabeth Fenn describes how that familiar biological agent, smallpox, was able to affect events on a continental scale in the 1770s because of new human travel patterns. The Hessian fly-previously unknown-began its movements during the same period, and within a decade linked such transatlantic odd couples as Flatbush farmers and the destroyers of the Bastille. 3 Looking beyond the eighteenth century, I suggest that the Hessian fly provides a useful starting point for examining how nationalism-involving issues of both political sovereignty and, more diffusely, xenophobia-has influenced the science and policy of biological invasions. As the first new environmental problem confronted by citizens of an independent United States, the insect shaped American naturalists' terminology, imagery, and expectations. It is easier, from a distance of two centuries, to see the implications buzzing around the Hessian fly, than to deal with the contemporary connotations of, for example, Africanized killer bees or Asian tiger mosquitos. 4 Finally, studying the scientific and diplomatic responses to Hessian flies indicates how historiographic emphasis on nationalism can be consistent with reliance on naturalism. These men of the Enlightenment saw themselves as naturalists in both the disciplinary and philosophical senses of the word. Yet for them the natural economy was a political one, in which science and diplomacy functioned as forces. Even if their understanding of nature and culture was incomplete, their comfort with this complexity should be taken seriously.
The entry of the Hessian fly into transatlantic history occurred in three phases. The first was centered in New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut between the late 1770s and early 1788. Various farmers and scientific gentlemen gradually recognized the existence of a phenomenologically new and problematic insect. Prominent Americans, including Morgan, Noah Webster, Jeremiah Wadsworth, Samuel Mitchill, Matthew Carey, and George Washington, discussed it in correspondence, learned organizations, and national publications. Overcoming the Hessian fly was one aspect of the struggle in the 1780s to constitute the United States as a nation.
A second, more intense, phase opened in London in May 1788. George III and the Privy Council, advised by botanical explorer and Royal Society president Joseph Banks, banned American wheat in order to keep the new insect from England. Their action was based on sketchy information, but was grounded on fears of agricultural disaster that were large in scope, plausible in theory, and appealing to predominant economic and political interests. Banks's repeatedly revised rationales for agricultural quarantine expressed both English leaders' understanding of the interrelations between the natural and political economies and their views on risk and on burdens of proof in environmental policy.
Finally, from August 1788 to the summer of 1790, events occurred on a stage that encompassed the United States, Canada, England, France, the Netherlands, and Fighting the Hessian Fly numerous German states. English leaders were able to establish as reasonable a policy grounded explicitly on lack of certainty because they mobilized a combined scientific-diplomatic network far more effective than anything possessed by such friends of America as Thomas Paine. In late 1789, however, a more compelling environmental crisis induced the Privy Council suddenly to reverse its carefully justified prohibition. The indefinite risks posed by an insect were less compelling than the immediate prospect of riot and revolution.
It is surprising that this story of environmental disaster and diplomacy, involving many of the most influential individuals in North America and Europe in the late eighteenth century, has not been detailed before. 5 I emphasize narrative in order to provide a new path through a canonical period in American and, to some extent, British, history. Linking migrations, science, and diplomacy highlights the Hessian fly's substantial participation in the Age of Revolution. In addition, I hope to advance a temperate and empirical approach in an area that is dominated by the crisis terminology of aliens, invaders, and killers. 6 
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George Morgan anticipated life as a rural republican gentleman. Part of a prosperous Philadelphia family, he worked before the revolution as a mercantile agent for British forces on the far western frontier, while at the same time participating in the newly-established American Philosophical Society. He then served the cause of independence as supply officer for the American army in western Pennsylvania and as an emissary to the Ohio Indian tribes. Morgan, like others in the revolutionary elite, anticipated that his prosperity ultimately would be secured through claims to western lands. But his immediate interest, as the war wound down, was to exchange his sword for a plowshare-to cultivate domestic happiness, agricultural improvement, and republican virtue. In 1779 he purchased a 300-acre farm on the outskirts of Princeton, New Jersey. With a panoramic view of the Navesink Highlands and toward the distant Atlantic Ocean, he gave his estate the descriptive, if not very imaginative, name, "Prospect." 7 Morgan's property had been heavily damaged by imperial forces in the first months of the war. In the autumn of 1776, before George Washington and his army memorably crossed the icy Delaware River and pushed the invaders back to New York, the occupying Hessians-unable to purchase supplies from sullen nativeshad appropriated food and liquor and burned all the available wood. Morgan put his yeoman neighbors and his slaves to work rebuilding Prospect's fences, planting trees to replace those cut down, and creating new plots for gardens. On those foundations Morgan initiated improvements. Following the guidance of English agricultural reformers, notably Arthur Young, he built a farmyard designed scientifically to facilitate manure recovery. He planted the fertilized fields that stretched southeast from his house toward the Stony Brook (now Lake Carnegie) with wheat. 8 Morgan's activities combined economic calculation, patriotic display, and leadership aspirations. Wheat, which could be easily exported directly from New Jersey to the West Indies, Newfoundland, or Europe, would provide the cash income necessary for his continued solvency. The rebuilding and beautification of Prospect (with carefully recorded plantings of fruit trees in particular) would show that Americans could repair "the works of death, desolation and tyranny" that the Declaration of Independence had ascribed to the "large Armies of foreign Mercenaries" being sent to the United States in 1776. Morgan's farmyard, as well as his design for a humane beehive, which could be opened without destroying the "useful creatures" inside, were models for American agricultural gentility; he described them proudly to the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture, an organization he helped to found in 1785. 9 A variety of outside forces, however, repeatedly undercut Morgan's efforts. The revolutionary elite's lack of leadership showed itself when the Continental Congress appeared, literally, on Morgan's doorstep, seeking a place to meet after being driven from Philadelphia in 1783 by unpaid troops. 10 The compatibility of political independence and mercantile prosperity was put into question as postwar British trade restrictions prevented the export of food crops from the United States to Canada and the Caribbean. Finally, agricultural production itself was threatened by the gradual spread of a previously unknown insect that attacked the crop on which Morgan and other landowners were pinning their hopes.
In the spring of 1786 Morgan watched his wheatfields with foreboding. The manured plants came up green and lush, but close examination found "White Worms which after a few days turn of a Chesnut Colour-They are deposited by a Fly between the Leaves & the Stalk of the green Wheat & generally at the lowermost Joint, and are inevitable Death to the Stalks they attack." These fluid-sucking larvae stunted the growth of the plants and damaged the stalks. Wind and rain knocked the plants over and made the sparse crop unharvestable. All that came from the fields later in the summer was a cloud of insects. Morgan wrote in his journal that "we call [this insect] the Hessian Fly." 11 What was new in 1786 was not discovery of the insect, but focused attention and the resolution to act. 12 As in the political realm, where the revolutionary elite shifted in that year from vague expressions of anxiety about the future of the United States to coherent statements regarding a "crisis" and to the organization of the constitutional convention, Morgan and others began to articulate the pest's importance, form networks of communication, and make the "Hessian fly" an object of general awareness and action. In July, Morgan persuaded his neighbor Thomas Clark, who was traveling to central Long Island, to collect information about the fly problem from farmers en route. Two months later, a letter describing the insect's life history and suggesting control methods began to circulate privately. 13 In January 1787 a new organization, the New York Society for Promoting Useful Knowledge, discussed the (still publicly unnamed) "insect destroying the wheat," and the governor of New York, George Clinton, used his address opening the state legislature to highlight "the fatal ravages" that wheat had suffered "since the commencement of the late war" and to ask citizens to share remedies. 14 The insect became a full participant on the national stage, and gained its distinctive name, in the American Museum, a new magazine created by Philadelphia printer Matthew Carey to revive the spirit of 1776 and to strengthen communication among the national elite. The inaugural issue (February 1787), which evocatively reprinted Thomas Paine's articulation of revolutionary consciousness, Common Sense, warned in an editorial paragraph that "that destructive insect, the Hessian fly," was spreading gradually from Staten Island, "where it was discovered about eight years ago." It warned that unless a remedy were found, "the whole continent will be over-run-a calamity more to be lamented than the ravages of war." 15 Two months later the magazine published a collection of unsigned letters discussing the animal's life-history and suggesting a variety of remedies (heavy fertilizing, late planting, rolling the young wheat to crush the worms, brushing fields with elderberry bushes, and spraying with salt water). 16 Then, in May and July, as delegates in Philadelphia drafted and debated the Constitution, George Morgan published his investigations. He had sent the Philadelphia Society for Promoting Agriculture samples of the fly and its "nits," and he reported that the insect, "about the size of a small ant," could be distinguished from similar animals under magnification by its long black legs and by its "whiskers, so small and motionless, as not to be easily perceived by the naked eye." He connected the facts reported by Americans to the world of learning by suggesting that the Hessian fly could be the same as an insect that the French agricultural experimenter Lullin de Chateauvieux had found in 1755. The Philadelphia organization, he suggested, should write officially to the Agricultural Society of Geneva for more information on that animal. On the more practical level, Morgan reported efforts to control the fly by manuring, rolling, and grazing the wheat. He asserted that the best long-term solution would be widespread use of a new "yellow-bearded" wheat variety (taken from an enemy sloop captured in the war and planted around Flushing, Long Island) that appeared to resist attack. 17 He called for action with a warning that reversed the great event of New Jersey's revolutionary history: the Hessian fly had just "crossed the Delaware" into Pennsylvania, and would continue to advance south and west. 18 Carey's American Museum continued to print letters on the Hessian fly into the fall, ranging from a report by a relative of the wealthy Connecticut patriot Jeremiah Wadsworth that plants grown from seeds steeped in elderberry juice resisted the fly, to an offer from a New York merchant to sell for a premium a vaguely-described wheat variety that he claimed would resist "that reptile," "the Hessian bug." 19 None of these publications claimed explicitly that the fly had been brought to the United States by the Hessians or by other imperial forces. What motivated Morgan was the comparison between the timing and behavior of "the human insect" and the actual insect. Both Hessians and Hessian flies were invaders who ravaged peaceful farms in New York and New Jersey, and left behind scenes of devastation and loss.
The coincidence in the appearance of Hessians and flies around New York City in the late 1770s was suggestive, however, and Morgan was, as he later noted, glad to spread prejudice about the former invaders. The idea that Hessians brought the fly was soon common enough that an evangelical jeremiad written in upstate New York in late 1787 reported that people had "fallen almost or quite into a frenzy" with the belief that "the Hessians have brought over thousands of little insects, on pur-Fighting the Hessian Fly pose to destroy this country." The pamphleteer was himself indifferent whether the insects had been brought "by Hessians, Turks, or Jews"; he was more concerned that Americans were trying to profit by selling supposedly resistant varieties of wheat, either fraudulently or at extortionate prices. 20 The idea that the Hessian fly came from Hesse was first broached in learned circles specifically to be denied. In early 1788, the twenty-three year-old Samuel L. Mitchill, just returned from medical school in Edinburgh and a European grand tour, published an overview of the insect in Noah Webster's American Magazine, a New York competitor of the American Museum. Mitchill summarized basic information on the fly's seasonality and life cycle, and presented a detailed account of the ways the larvae damaged growing wheat plants. Other parts of the essay were more problematical. Unable to find eggs, he suggested that the flies were similar to aphids in producing live offspring; he also naively suggested to farmers that the insects could be "driven off by a row of people scourging them across a lot with flaps." Mitchill's adolescent cosmopolitanism was evident in both his display of familiarity with such standard but marginally relevant scientific authorities as Albrecht von Haller and Lazzaro Spallanzani, and in his discussion of the animal's name. Noting that "a report has currently prevailed that he is of Hessian origin, and brought to this country by the soldiers from that principality," Mitchill commented that he had inquired among "several intelligent men, from that part of Europe" and obtained no support for the idea. He believed that the fly had either migrated to America from some unknown region, or that it was "long a resident of our territories," but had just discovered wheat as a food. 21 Worse Than the Plague Worse Than the Plague Worse Than the Plague Worse Than the Plague Worse Than the Plague Americans learned about the Hessian fly gradually and directly in diverse local settings; their efforts were directed much more toward fashioning collective awareness and action than toward uncovering the past. Europeans-more particularly, the British-responded under quite different circumstances. A small group operating at the nexus of imperial knowledge and power discovered the insect in purely textual form. They reacted immediately by banning wheat imports from the United States. For men who disliked both the victorious revolutionaries and their grains, this was an easy decision to make, but one that was hard to explain clearly. English leaders understood that pinning down the insect's migratory history and potential were crucial to justifying their action. Their repeated changes in intellectual position, however, exemplify how scientific knowledge and political interests interwove in an ordinary environmental crisis at this time.
The Marquis of Carmarthan, Britain's foreign minister, learned about the Hessian fly in late May 1788 through a confidential report from Phineas Bond, his consul in Philadelphia. Son and nephew of prominent Philadelphia physicians, Bond was a loyalist who had escaped to England after facing a Pennsylvania treason indictment in 1777. He was able to return nine years later only because he had acquired diplomatic status. 22 A semi-secret agent, Mr. Bond protected imperial interests by preventing importation of English cotton spinning machinery, and by warning customs officers about American efforts to smuggle tea into Ireland. When he learned in April 1788 that Philadelphia merchants were planning to ship large amounts of wheat to England, he immediately notified London about the new and ruinous insect "called the Hessian Fly." Emphasizing Connecticut patrician Jeremiah Wadsworth's report in the American Museum that the insects could be controlled by soaking wheat grains in elderberry juice, Bond argued that "it is but reasonable to conclude that this process destroys the Egg in the Grain," and hence that grain contained Hessian fly eggs. He warned that importation of American grain infested with the fly could destroy English wheat culture. 23 The Privy Council Committee for Trade, Bond's chief audience, was receptive to his message. Lords Carmarthen, Sheffield, and Hawkesbury, and their scientific adviser, Joseph Banks, were all hardliners toward the new United States. They believed that the Americans should get the independence they had demanded, and more: Britain should eliminate all special ties with the former rebels and should reconfigure imperial trade to exclude them. 24 In addition, they argued that higher agricultural tariffs and thus higher wheat prices would stimulate home production, thereby improving the agricultural economy, increasing the security of the food supply, and, incidentally, enriching rural gentry like themselves. 25 Parliamentary enactment of a higher tariff, which would directly increase the price of bread for urban workers, was not politically feasible in the late 1780s; but administrators could prohibit imports of pestiferous grain.
Banks provided both the scientific basis and the leadership for the government's action against the new American insect. 26 Since Bond had supplied little more than a name and a warning, Banks was (in his own words) "utterly ignorant what insect it was that the Americans meant by the Hessian Fly." The subject, however, "appeared to him so pregnant with danger to his country" that he sought to do whatever he could. 27 With only a few days to respond, he turned to the available technical literature. Finding a paper on a wheat insect in the American Philosophical Society's Transactions, Banks reported that the Hessian fly, "more generally called The Flying Wevil," had been known in Virginia for at least fifty years. The larval stage of this "minute moth" penetrated and fed on wheat grains. It differed, Banks explained, from the "Wevil of Europe," by having wings and by attacking the grain in both the warehouse and in the field; as a consequence it could easily be transported in grain and was "an Evil of a most dreadful Nature." 28 On June 25 the Privy Council and George III received Banks's recommendations and prohibited entry of American wheat until further notice. 29 The problem with Banks's argument was that his identification of the Hessian fly with the Virginia "flying wevil" was simply incorrect. He soon recognized his error and tried to rectify the situation, but had great difficulty developing a consistent position. Banks realized that the Hessian fly was a novel insect on July 2, when he read Samuel Mitchill's American Magazine essay. Rather than retract his call to action, however, he advised the Privy Council three days later that while the Hessian fly, which "confin[ed] its Ravages to the Blade of the Corn," would not be a problem, the flying wevil was a real danger. On July 8, however, he shifted position Fighting the Hessian Fly again: He argued that there was "great reason" to believe that the Hessian fly laid its eggs on the grain, and not the straw; warning that both the flying wevil and the Hessian fly were causing "alarming ravages" in America, he asserted that each independently would justify prohibition of imports "capable of bringing . . . the Seeds of so dreadful a Calamity." 30 The council accepted Banks's statements without question. Issues arose, however, when the Customs Office began to set up procedures to inspect American grain already in English warehouses. 31 Local officials in Liverpool informed London that all the insects in American grain shipments were the same kind of "wevil" and were all dead; they therefore posed no problem. 32 Banks dismissed such sweeping claims from provincials who "cannot be presumed to possess so much knowledge of insects as those who have dedicated a large portion of their time to the study of natural history," but then was shocked to receive, not bureaucratic acquiesence, but a scientific challenge.
33 James Currie, a young physician who had wandered the Atlantic as an adolescent during the revolution, critiqued both Banks's natural history and the council's policy. He argued that the flying wevil was not a problem since it had lived so long in Virginia without entering England; he emphasized that the Hessian fly fed on stalks, and that a propensity for the same insect also to enter the grain was "not consonant with the course of nature." Noting that "Government" had initially confused two different insects, and, after being warned against one, was taking action against the other, Currie regretted that evidence seemed to be "biased by interest." He emphasized that "the judgment of men of science unconnected with commerce," such as Banks and himself, needed to prevail, and boldly offered his services as a partner and consultant. 34 Banks's response to this challenge took two forms. He directed that Currie be excluded from further service as an inspector; more significantly, he prepared a sweeping biopolitical justification for the Privy Council's course of action. 35 This careful report emphasized that, although a bug's life was generally quite predictable, under unusual environmental circumstances it could be greatly extended in length-"a Circumstance as curious perhaps as any that has been observed in the History of animated Nature." The claims that neither the wevil nor the fly could cross the Atlantic were plausible, Banks admitted; yet they "do not on the whole amount to that Degree of Certainty, which in Matters of such material Importance ought to be required." The wevil had gradually moved north in America over the last thirty years, and hence was now more likely to survive in England. Banks was persuaded by the argument "from general Analogy" that the Hessian fly laid its eggs on the leaves and not the grain, but he countered that eggs could mix with grain during threshing and might be transported across the Atlantic in that form. 36 From Banks's perspective, however, plausible scenarios about the activities of insects mattered less than the broader landscape of interactions between the natural and human economies. He explained dispassionately that the introduction of a new wheat insect into England would be "a Calamity of much more extensive and fatal Consequences than the Admission of the Plague." Plague resulted only in "the extinction of a certain proportion of the human Species, which may be, and generally is replaced in the next Generation." Insects, by contrast, could permanently affect food supply, and thereby result in a "real Diminution of Population," and hence the power of the state. Banks calculated that every English wheat farmer supplied eleven people-himself, "six manufacturers, and four of the affluent, their unproductive dependants, or the army." A one-sixth drop in domestic production would mean-since the affluent and the army would not cut consumption-that one in six workers must either "cease to eat, and consequently to labour," or would need to buy imported food. In the latter case, the benefit of that labor would go to foreigners, because, from Banks's physiocratic perspective, "food, and food only is the creator, and . . . the whole of the honest gain it produces, must ultimately center in the Country that produces the food." 37 Banks, the creator of a global botanic empire, imagined England in its agricultural character as a biogeographically isolated island. The familiar image of plague encapsulated the alternative between the potential for disaster resulting from the entry of American wheat and the indefinite continuation of the environmental present at a small but continuing cost. Framed this way, the political choice was easy. Implementation would be guided by naturalists, the new guardians of agricultural national security.
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Joseph Banks was committed to rationality and fact. He outlined his reasons for the quarantine, he explained, so that "if by better Information than we have at present, they appear hereafter to be erroneous, it may be retracted." On the other hand, he set an extraordinary standard for acknowledging error: In a matter with such consequences, "a positive proof that no danger whatever exists should be exacted." 38 As the news about the Hessian fly circulated around Europe and, with a two-month time lag, traveled back to the United States, efforts were made to provide that proof. The different positions advanced, and the character of the eventually persuasive argument, enable a retrospective critique of this kind of practical reason in the late 1700s.
Banks, first of all, sought to determine whether there really was a "Hessian" fly. If the insect did not live in Germany, the insult that imperial troops had brought a pest across the Atlantic would dissipate; in addition, the fly's absence from central Europe would strengthen the argument that it was in fact American, and thus a new and alien menace to English agriculture. In August 1788 the Foreign Office sent queries to its emissaries throughout central Europe. With one exception, ambassadors reported back that their contacts did not believe that any local insect had the characteristics of the Hessian fly. 39 Assertions that an unknown pest was absent were problematical, however. A few respondents sought to anchor their claims in citations to the new naturalists' bible, the collected works of Linnaeus, with one suggesting that the Hessian fly was the Scandinavian Musca secalis. The exceptional respondant-an anonymous consultant in the Austrian Netherlands-emphasized the deeper difficulty. If the English really wanted to know whether the insect existed in the Low Countries, he argued, they would need to supply "either an exact Fighting the Hessian Fly diagram of the different stages of the insect, or the insect itself in its different stages." A merely verbal description was too vague to provide any basis for serious study. 40 French agricultural naturalists, whose perspective was both continental and philosophic, treated the British inquiry with careful condescension. A committee of the Royal Academy of Agriculture, then the world center for practical entomology, sought to avoid nomenclatural bias by discussing Banks's insects only as #1 (the flying wevil) and #2 (the Hessian fly). They suggested that #1 was a European species investigated in Angoumois in 1755; although it periodically caused problems, it was not a major agricultural threat. 41 Insect #2, they believed, had been found by Linnaeus in Scandinavia, and named Phaliena graminis; animals like it existed in France, but had not been studied in depth because they had never caused enough damage to "attract the attention of the Government." 42 French naturalists saw Europe teeming with poorly known insects. Humans could fight these animals when they became rampant, but could not stop them from crossing the borders. To the French, the British dream of isolating their island from the rest of the world was feverishly unrealistic.
Americans of a variety of sorts responded vigorously as soon as they learned, two months after the fact, that the British government was condemning their wheat. 43 The lead was taken by John Temple, a Massachusetts native married to the daughter of Governor James Bowdoin, who served, in New York, as British consul-general. This well-known "friend of America" interpreted the letter that arrived in late August (with a copy of Banks's first report) as a search for reassurance that American wheat was in fact safe. His energetic inquiries on behalf of the Foreign Office put him within a week in direct contact with George Morgan. 44 Morgan marked up Temple's copy of Banks's report, prepared an expansive and blunt cover letter, and provided a copy of his recent exchange with George Washington regarding ways to fight the fly. Morgan's commentary included his claim that he had christened the "Hessian fly," his belief that the insect had somehow arrived in straw "at an early period of the late war," and his discovery that it had first infested fields "in the neighbourhood of Sir William Howe's debarkation [on Staten Island], and at Flat Bush." 45 He dismissed Banks's June 4 report completely, asserting that anyone who would "confound the Virginia Wheat Fly with the Hessian Fly, which are as different as a Toad from a Snake," was completely misinformed. He provided an elementary account of American wheat insects, explaining that the Virginia wheat fly (Banks's flying wevil) was a "minute moth" that fed on grain, but was long established and easily controlled; the flying-ant-like Hessian fly, by contrast, "had no connection immediately with the grain," and thus would not survive in transatlantic shipments.
Morgan pressed the reconciliatory message that the English had nothing to fear from American wheat. However, the former frontier revolutionary could not resist reminding royal officials that "were a single straw containing this insect in the egg, or aurelia, to be carried and safely deposited in the centre of Norfolk in England, it would multiply in a few years so as to destroy all the wheat and barley crops of the whole kingdom." Americans' distress could be, at least in the imagination, a source of power. 46 
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Phineas Bond, like anyone on the scene in America, understood immediately that Banks had erred in conflating the flying wevil and the Hessian fly. He sought to reinforce his original warning about the latter, however, by carefully cultivating uncertainties. Bond wrote the foreign secretary that Americans' claims that the animals fed and propagated only in straw were undercut by their lack of good microscopes and other "suitable instruments" for discovery. If, however, the eggs were laid in the straw, and, as Americans asserted "with great earnestness," the fly "was brought hitherto in the straw beds and baggage of the German troops employed in the late war," then American shippers could easily carry it to Britain. "Plain, intelligent, artless" farmers had informed Bond that Hessian flies could be found in stored wheat. This unselfconscious testimony was more trustworthy than the claims of leaders like Morgan, who were biased in favor of "the interests of the country." Bond concluded that "the works of nature are so minute, and its modes so inscrutable, as to baffle every endeavour hitherto made to form a satisfactory conclusion." Not having "any conclusive fact" from which the non-transportability of the fly followed, "the wisdom of guarding against so grievous a calamity by all due caution, must be evident." 47 In February 1789 Joseph Banks reviewed the hundreds of pages of memoranda he had received. Believing that he now knew "as much on the subject as the Americans themselves," he considered the full range of arguments advanced and decided that Phineas Bond's analysis of dangers and uncertainties (and his own initial recommendation for action) had been basically right. Contrary to American expectations, Banks reported to the Privy Council, there was no indication that the Hessian fly ever lived in Hesse or anywhere else in Europe, nor that it had been carried across the Atlantic during the war. In the face of Americans' "bold" assertions that the fly would not come to England in their grain, he declared that "with nearly if not exactly the same materials before me, as these gentlemen have made use of, I have not been able to draw a similar conclusion, nor indeed any certain conclusion whatever." He backed Bond's argument that until British officials could be sure that the Hessian fly could never be transported across the Atlantic, American grain shipments should be banned. Americans, he suggested, needed to investigate both the identity and the mode of propagation of the insect further, and he helpfully supplied a bibliography. In the meantime, Americans needed to control themselves: Paraphrasing Morgan's comment about the placement of eggs in Norfolk, he warned that "there cannot exist so atrocious a villain, as to commit such an act intentionally." 48 In late March the Privy Council (operating in the absence of George III, who was in the midst of his first attack of porphyric insanity), accepted Banks's report. Prime Minister William Pitt forwarded it to Parliament, and that body ordered that the most significant documents be printed in full as testimony to the world regarding the reasoning behind the import ban. Proceedings of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and Information Received, Respecting an Insect, Supposed to Infest the Wheat of the Territories of the United States of America, a large-format pamphlet, appeared in late April; it gained wider circulation when Arthur Young reprinted it in the Annals of Agriculture. 49 
Fighting the Hessian Fly
This document generated considerable controversy around London. Thomas Paine, skeptical as always about British leaders' motives, told Banks to his face that the import prohibition "was only a political manoeuvre of the Ministry to please the landed interest, as a balance for prohibiting the exportation of Wool to please the manufacturing interest." Jefferson, in Paris, complained indirectly to Banks that the report was a "libel on our wheat." Banks ignored Paine, and brushed off Jefferson's "warm expressions" as unreasonable. Still concerned about Morgan's agroterrorist threat, he warned Jefferson that "obloquy" would fall on all Americans if "any one of them should wilfully bring over the Fly" in retaliation for British action. On the other hand, he accepted with equanimity the declaration of the Duke of Grafton, a former prime minister, that the Hessian fly was a miraculous creation-a "scourge of Heaven . . . upon such ungratefull colonies and rebellious people." 50 American newspapers, surprisingly, were almost completely silent when the Privy Council's Proceedings arrived in the summer of 1789. 51 To understand why, we need to look beyond the circulation of documents toward the circulation of weather currents. During the year that Banks was building his case for the continued prohibition of American wheat, storms and cold in both Europe and northern North America were producing the worst grain shortages in decades. The price of bread in Paris began to rise in August 1788, and Louis XVI's government, anxious that social instability not exacerbate the country's ongoing financial and constitutional crises, opened ports to unlimited importation of American wheat. In November the French began to offer a bounty to encourage shipments, and by the summer of 1789 Philadelphia and New York wheat prices were reaching the high end of their postwar range. (The doubling of the price of bread in Paris, meanwhile, had helped ignite the French Revolution.) 52 Within that context, the British quarantine was irrelevant.
The English also faced a food crisis, but not so quickly as the French. The thin harvest of 1788, combined with the ban on American imports and the shortage on the continent, produced exactly the result that landowners such as Banks had hoped for: The London price of wheat rose and stayed above forty-four shillings per quarter for the first time in four years. Matters became worrisome, however, when the 1789 crop failed across much of the island. London wheat prices spiked in midsummer to sixty-nine shillings, and then fluctuated for the rest of the year around fiftyfive, well above the previous decades' average of forty. Privy Council leaders shared Banks's biosocial interpretation of the relations among food, prices, and population. But, while the naturalist could write philosophically that under certain circumstances one in six laborers might "cease to eat," politicians emphasized the potential for "popular commotions" in times of shortage and the government's responsibility for "the subsistence of the People." 53 During 1789 they worried increasingly about the island's wheat supply. They were equally concerned about the potential for infection from France, not by the Hessian fly, but by the revolution. The effects that French ideas and models of mass behavior might have on a population stressed by food shortages were unknown, but English gentry could readily imagine the possibilities.
British policy changed abruptly in November, just as the Privy Council was approving emergency food shipments to the Channel Islands to forestall starvation and mutiny. Foreign Secretary Carmarthen (now the Duke of Leeds) sent Temple and Bond a leading inquiry: first, whether "the Evil arising from the Wevil or Hessian Fly [had] wholly ceased," and then, whether Americans had a wheat surplus, what were current prices, whether other countries had cornered the market, and whether English merchants had placed orders. 54 Three days later the Privy Council jumped ahead of this correspondence by interviewing merchants with American connections. Hearing that "the Hessian Fly had not at all appeared, . . . that the crops have been very abundant, and that the price of wheat at New York by the last accounts was 4 shillings per bushel," the council recommended an immediate end to the quarantine and ordered the navy to dispatch a ship to New York immediately with the news. 55 When HMS Echo arrived with the new order in February 1790, together with rumors that more than 140 vessels were on their way to buy wheat, the New York Daily Gazette sneered, "what avail will this be to England? None; for in the first place, the Americans have no wheat to spare; and if they had, all the French ports are ready to swallow it up at ten shillings a quarter above the price of the British market."
56 As the Hudson thawed and prices continued to rise, however, stored grain was released and shipped in large quantities to England. Temple and Bond each understood the new situation, parrotting back their assurances that "the evil [is] thought to have wholly ceased." 57 A good English harvest in 1790 caused prices and imports to drop, and in the following year Parliament amended the Corn Laws to encourage domestic production. But the issue of the Hessian fly did not reemerge. When Bond warned his superiors in July that the pest was reappearing in American fields, he received no response. Diplomatic historian Charles Ritcheson concluded that in 1789 British leaders decided that the United States would likely function in the future as their island's reserve food source. Having watched the ancien regime collapse in France, they were willing to accept the hazards posed by an insect. 58 
Conceptualizing Invasion Conceptualizing Invasion Conceptualizing Invasion Conceptualizing Invasion Conceptualizing Invasion
The efforts of American and European men of knowledge and power to establish reasonable courses of action regarding the Hessian fly, within settings that contained incorrigible uncertainties, can be understood at three different degrees of interpretive resolution: economy, policy, and science. The coarsest interpretation is that grounded in the principles advanced by Joseph Banks. He understood the British people as animals seeking to maximize food and comfort within a humannatural economy. We can extend this perspective to include British leaders also. Banks, Carmarthen, and Pitt were organisms under stress, pressured not only by the Hessian fly, but also by the madness of King George and by the French Revolution. Between the spring of 1788 and the autumn of 1789, they repeatedly adjusted their assessments of the imagined risks and benefits facing the populations about which they cared most. Their final position-that the immediate need for food for British Fighting the Hessian Fly people was greater than the danger posed by the Hessian fly-made sense at the time. Viewed in retrospect, it was reasonable, humane, and, in its implications for both wheat culture and national culture, it was benign. Louis XVI, for whom the Hessian fly was one among many headaches, was not so lucky.
A higher level of analysis focuses on human actors as rational and political animals, and more particularly on the means by which policies grounded in uncertainty became credible. The British dominated this situation because they possessed recognized naturalists, a fully functioning diplomatic network, and a comprehensive perspective on the interrelations among food plants, insects, travel, human populations, and mass behavior. The former colonials, by contrast, were uninformed, unconnected, and empiric. Banks in particular was able to articulate how the new American insects posed risks for the natural and political economies of Britain, and was confident in demanding what was logically impossible: The Americans should prove that Hessian flies could not cross the Atlantic to England. Reinforcing his position with international testimony, Banks raised standards of certainty over time and articulated the reasonableness of positions that were grounded explicitly on continuing lack of knowledge. The most intricate questions, then and later, revolved around science. One motivation behind this article has been to convey the seriousness and difficulty of knowing about insects in the eighteenth century. Entomology was not merely an effete hobby or a subfield of natural theology, but rather a highly consequential body of technical knowledge. Banks developed procedures for detecting insects in the large quantitities of plant seeds then being shipped into Britain. Individuals in geographically dispersed settings struggled to communicate intelligibly about animals with imprecise identities. Naturalists in the 1780s were recognizing increasingly that Linnean names were valuable, because potentially universal, reference points. But-as the different suggested binomials indicate-they were unable to get this method to work.
Over the next century entomologists intermittently looked back at the events of the 1770s in order to understand the habits and vulnerabilities of the fly and to address the nationalistically-colored issues of nativity and responsibility. They mustered the resources of a growing international communications network grounded in technical literature, illustrated reference works, and museum reference collections, but they struggled against loss of memory and the ability of the insect to cover its migratory tracks. In the early 1790s Thomas Jefferson led an American Philosophical Society committee that asked the American public, among other things, whether the Hessian fly had existed in North America prior to the revolution. (The committee produced no report). 59 Samuel Mitchill, impressed that French and Italian memoirs sent to him by Banks contained no description of the species, declared that "Hessian fly" was a misnomer, and that the animal should properly be called "the American wheat-insect." 60 The discovery of the fly in Minorca, Russia, and Austria in the 1830s and 1840s reopened questions regarding its homeland and the circumstances of its appearance in America. Disagreement between entomologists with, not surprisingly, German and American allegiances gradually built to a climax. 61 In the 1880s Germanic
Harvard professor Hermann Hagen and midwestern federal scientist Charles V. Riley rediscovered the documents Banks had published, disputed the details of German military discipline during the revolution, and struggled with inaccuracies in the transcriptions of the American Philosophical Society's early minutes. Riley prevailed with arguments that were both broadly ecological and grounded in study of primary sources. He declared that the Hessian fly had evolved in western Asia along with its host species, that it had spread to southern Europe by the 1700s, that its ability to survive as a puparium for more than a year in cool dry circumstances (discovered in the mid-nineteenth century) meant that it could conceivably have traveled across the Atlantic, and that it had arrived in New York during the early years of the revolution. This view continues to be the scientific consensus. 62 Drawing on modern histories of British logistics during the revolution, I suggest a more paradoxically pointed reformulation of Riley's scenario. The Hessian fly could have arrived in New York in 1776 along with imperial expeditionary forces; these troops came, not only from England and Germany, but also from Minorca and Gibraltar. The insect's more probable migration pathway, however, was in the large shipments of forage that began arriving in New York harbor from many parts of Europe in 1777. This variation on sending coals to Newcastle was necessary, David Syrett has explained, because British plans to feed their horses on the vast amounts of grass and straw that could be requisitioned from loyal natives of New Jersey were stymied by Washington's victories at the Battles of Trenton and Princeton the previous winter. The arrival of the Hessian fly was thus an ecological "revenge effect" resulting specifically from Americans' violent assertion, in New Jersey, of political independence. 63 This claim does not, however, entail the conclusion that the Hessian fly was a biological invader. Such a perspective would be as partial as the view that the American Revolution was a fight between natives and aliens. First, the concept of invasion is problematic. Mayetiola was rejoining a Eurasian host that had left it behind fewer than three hundred years earlier. It settled in fields that were familiar because they had been cultivated by generations of European and African Americans. The Hessian fly depressed wheat growth locally along the seaboard in the 1790s, but it soon became a paradigmatic manageable naturalized pest. Populations fluctuated with the extent of monoculture, choice of cultivars, and extent of parasites. Farmers in the nineteenth century increasingly followed entomologists' advice and outsmarted the insect by delaying fall planting until the summer adults ceased egg deposition. Waiting for the "fly-free date" became part of the natural rhythm of American agriculture. 64 The deeper and more difficult issue concerns the extent to which the Hessian fly invasion was biological. In the 1770s the species was unknown to the learned, and perhaps to all humans. It travelled-to New York in North America, rather than to Norfolk in England-only because of a number of singular circumstances. On the one hand, political identities were diverging to the point that British military agent George Morgan, for example, could recreate himself as a model American farmer, while his Philadelphia neighbor Phineas Bond became an English gentleman who left his country in 1786 to live in Pennsylvania. On the other hand, armies were Fighting the Hessian Fly converging in circumstances that led to the peculiarly uneconomic transport of large quantities of wheatstraw from places such as Minorca and Poland to Staten Island. While the Hessian fly finally arrived in England in the 1880s, either from the Continent or from North America, the species never established itself in, for example, South America or Australia. Its migrations were influenced much more profoundly by events generally seen as parts of political history than by any aspect of its natural history.
Emphasizing the highly charged revolutionary events during which the Hessian fly appeared in North America clarifies both the name and the broader intellectual framework used to characterize it. The language of invasion was at the center of awareness among Americans like George Morgan. As he looked out from Prospect in the 1780s he saw fields where his compatriots had, a few years earlier, heroically pushed back forces from foreign lands. It is hard to imagine that, when he saw insects pushing across the New Jersey landscape from the direction of New Brunswick, where the imperial soldiers had massed, he could think of them in any way other than as invaders. Such a perspective, this essay has argued, was in fact an accurate reading of the situation, both in relation to the movements of forces in the war, and more specifically, to the Battle of Princeton. Such a perfect overlay of the natural on the political was an exceptional event, however. As I write this, a few months after September 11, 2001 , Americans are anxious about human invaders from the Fertile Crescent, and also, admittedly to a lesser extent, about invertebrate "alien invaders" from the Old World. 65 I doubt, however, that exploring parallels between these two groups can be as constructive now, either intellectually or politically, as in the 1780s. 
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